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What the European Council decided 
On December 5, 1978, the Heads 
of Government of the nine Com-
munity countries agreed on the 
details of the new European 
Monetary System. The United King-
dom declared that it would not take 
part in the mechanism for linking 
exchange rates when the system 
began, but after initial hesitation 
Italy and Ireland decided to join. 
EMS is delayed by disagreement 
about the phasing out of Monetary 
Compensatory Amounts; but the 
European Council's decisions form 
a Community basis for the new 
EMS, subject to the Community's 
policy-making process, and open to 
the accession of all member States: 
D within two years of the introduc-
tion of the system, mechanisms and 
procedures will be established for a 
definitive system which will lead to 
the creation of a European Monetary 
Fund; 
D the central element of the EMS 
will be the European Currency Unit 
(ECU). This will be valued at the 
same value as the European unit of 
account. 
D the margin of fluctuation of par-
ticipating currencies will be 2.25 per 
cent, but with provision for a 6 per 
cent fluctuation margin for 
countries which currently have 
floating rates; 
D actual changes in exchange rates 
will be decided through a Com-
munity procedure by the countries 
participating in the exchange rate 
mechanism and the European 
Commission. Non-participants in 
the exchange rate mechanism will be 
involved in any important decisions 
on exchange rate policy; 
D the credit available will amount 
to 14,000m ECU for short-term 
support and 11,000m ECU for 
medium-term credit about 
£16,000m in total. 
We print below the full text of the 
European Council's Resolution 
establishing the EMS, followed by 
the explanatory Notes contained in 
the British Government's White 
Paper on the subject (Cmnd. 7410). 
A. The European Monetary System 
1. Introduction 
1.1 In Bremen we discussed a 
'scheme for the creation of closer 
monetary cooperation leading to a 
zone of monetary stability in 
Europe'. We regarded such a zone 
'as a highly desirable objective' and 
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envisaged 'a durable and effective 
scheme'. 
1.2 Today, after careful 
examination of the preparatory 
work done by the Council and other 
Community bodies, we are agreed 
as follows: 
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A European Monetary System 
(EMS) will be set up on January l, 
1979. (Now delayed: see above) 
1.3 We are firmly resolved to 
ensure the lasting success of the 
EMS by policies conducive to 
greater stability at home and abroad 
for both deficit and surplus countries. 
1.4 The following chapters deal 
primarily with the initial phase of 
the EMS. 
We remain firmly resolved to con-
solidate, not later than two years 
after the start of the scheme, into a 
final system the provisions and pro-
cedures thus created. This system 
will entail the creation of the 
European Monetary Fund as 
announced in the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting at 
Bremen on July 6/7, 1978, as well as 
the full utilization of the ECU I as a 
reserve asset and a means of settle-
ment. It will be based on adequate 
legislation at the Community as well 
as the national level. 
2. The ECU and its 
functions 
2.1 A European Currency Unit 
(ECU) will be at the centre of the 
EMS. The value and the com-
position of the ECU will be identical 
with the value of the EUA at the 
outset of the system. 
2.2 The ECU will be used 
(a) as the denominator (numeraire) 
for the exchange rate mechanism 
(b) as the basis for a divergence 
indicator 
(c) as the denominator for opera-
tions in both the intervention and 
the credit mechanism 
( d) as a means of settlement between 
monetary authorities of the EC. 
2.3 The weights of currencies in 
the ECU will be re-examined and if 
necessary revised within six months 
of the entry into force of the system 
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and thereafter every five years or, 
on request, if the weight of any 
currency has changed by 25 per 
cent. 
Revisions have to be mutually 
accepted; they will, by themselves, 
not modify the external value of the 
ECU. They will be made in line with 
underlying economic criteria. 
3 The exchange rate and 
the intervention 
mechanism 
3 .1 Each currency will have an 
ECU-related central rate. These 
central rates will be used to establish 
a grid of bilateral exchange rates. 
Around these exchange rates 
fluctuation margins of ± 2.25 per 
cent will be established. EC countries 
with presently floating currencies 
may opt for wider margins up to ± 6 
per cent at the outset of EMS; these 
margins should be gradually 
reduced as soon as economic con-
ditions permit to do so. 
A member State which does not 
participate in the exchange rate 
mechanism at the outset may par-
ticipate at a later date. 
3.2 Adjustments of central rates 
will be subject to mutual agreement 
by a common procedure which will 
comprise all countries participating 
in the exchange rate mechanism and 
the Commission. There will be 
reciprocal consultation in the Com-
munity framework about important 
decisions concerning exchange rate 
policy between countries participat-
ing and any country not partici-
pating in the system. 
3.3 In principle, interventions 
will be made in participating 
currencies. 
3 .4 Intervention in participating 
currencies is compulsory when the 
intervention points defined by the 
fluctuation margins are reached. 
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3 .5 An ECU basket formula will 
be used as an indicator to detect 
divergences between Community 
currencies. A 'threshold of diver-
gence' will be fixed at 75 per cent of 
the maximum spread of divergence 
for each currency. It will be cal-
culated in such a way as to eliminate 
the influence of weight on the 
probability to reach the threshold. 
3.6 When a currency crosses its 
'threshold of divergence', this results 
in a presumption that the authorities 
concerned will correct this situation 
by adequate measures, namely:-
(a) Diversified intervention; 
(b) Measures of domestic monetary 
policy; 
(c) Changes in central rates; 
(d) Other measures of economic 
policy. 
In case such measures, on account 
of special circumstances, are not 
taken, the reasons for this shall 2 be 
given to the other authorities, 
especially in the 'concertation 
between Central Banks'. 
Consultations will, if necessary, 
then take place in the appropriate 
Community bodies, including the 
Council of Ministers. 
After six months these provisions 
shall 2 be reviewed in the light of 
experience. At that date the 
questions regarding imbalances 
accumulated by divergent creditor 
or debtor countries will be studied 
as well. 
3.7 A Very Short Term Facility 
of an unlimited amount will be 
established. Settlements will be 
made 45 days after the end of the 
month of intervention with the 
possibility of prolongation for 
another 3 months for amounts 
limited to the size of debtor quotas 
in the Short Term Monetary Support. 
3.8 To serve as a means of settle-
ment, an initial supply of ECU will 
be provided by FECOM against the 
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deposit of 20 per cent of gold and 20 
per cent of dollar reserves currently 
held by Central Banks. 
This operation will take the form 
of specified, revolving swap arrange-
ments. By periodical review and by 
an appropriate procedure it will be 
ensured that each Central Bank will 
maintain a deposit of at least 20 per 
cent of these reserves with FECOM. 
A member State not participating in 
the exchange rate mechanism may 
participate in this initial operation 
on the basis described above. 
4. The credit mechanisms 
4.1 The existing credit mech-
anisms with their present rules of 
application will be maintained for 
the initial phase of the EMS. They 
will be consolidated into a single 
fund in the final phase of the EMS. 
4.2 The credit mechanisms will be 
extended to an amount of 25 billion 
ECU of effectively available credit. 
The distribution of this amount will 
be as follows: 
Short Term Monetary Support= 
= 14 bnECU 
Medium Term Financial Assistance 
= 11 bnECU 
4.3 The duration of the Short 
Term Monetary Support will be 
extended for another 3 months on the 
same conditions as the first 
extension. 
4.4 The increase of the Medium 
Term Financial Assistance will be 
completed by June 30, 1979. In the 
meantime, countries which will need 
national legislation are expected to 
make their extended medium-term 
quotas available by an interim 
financing agreement of the Central 
Banks concerned. 
5. Third countries and 
international organisations 
5.1 The durability of EMS and its 
international implications require 
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coordination of exchange rate 
policies vis-a-vis third countries 
and, as far as possible, a 
concertation with the monetary 
authorities of those countries. 
5.2 European countries with par-
ticularly close economic and 
financial ties with the European 
Community may participate in the 
exchange rate and intervention 
mechanism. 
Participation will be based upon 
agreements between Central Banks; 
these agreements will be com-
municated to the Council and the 
Commission of the EC. 
5.3 EMS is and will remain fully 
compatible with the relevant articles 
of the IMF agreement. 
6. Further procedure 
6.1 To implement the decisions 
taken under A, the European 
Council requests the Council to 
consider and to take a decision on 
December 18, 1978 on the following 
proposals of the Commission: 
(a) Council Regulation modifying 
the unit of account used by the 
European Fund of Monetary 
Cooperation, which introduces the 
ECU in the operations of the EMCF 
and defines its composition; 
(b) Council Regulation permitting 
the EMCF to receive monetary 
reserves and to issue ECU's to the 
monetary authorities of the member 
States which may use them as a 
means of settlement; 
(c) Council Regulation on the 
impact of the European Monetary 
System on the common agricultural 
policy. The European Council con-
siders that the introduction of the 
EMS should not of itself result in 
any change in the situation obtain-
ing prior to January 1, 1979 regard-
ing the expression in national 
currencies of agricultural prices, 
monetary compensatory amounts 
and all other amounts fixed for the 
purpose of the common agricultural 
policy. 
The European Council stresses 
the importance of henceforth avoid-
ing the creation of permanent 
MCAs and progressively reducing 
present MCAs in order to re-establish 
the unit of prices of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, giving also due 
consideration to price policy. 
B. Measures designed to strengthen the economies 
of the less prosperous member States of the 
European Monetary System 
1 We stress that, within the 
context of a broadly-based strategy 
aimed at improving the prospects of 
economic development and based 
on symmetrical rights and 
obligations of all participants, the 
most important concern should be 
to enhance the convergence of 
economic policies towards greater 
stability. We request the Council 
(Economics and Finance Ministers) 
to strengthen its procedures for co-
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ordination in order to improve that 
convergence. 
2 We are aware that the conver-
gence of economic policies and of 
economic performance will not be 
easy to achieve. Therefore, steps 
must be taken to strengthen the 
economic potential of the less 
prosperous countries of the Com-
munity. This is primarily the 
responsibility of the member States 
concerned. Community measures 
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can and should serve a supporting 
role. 
3 The European Council agrees 
that in the context of the European 
Monetary System, the following 
measures in favour of the less pros-
perous member States effectively 
and fully participating in the 
Exchange Rate and Intervention 
Mechanisms will be taken. 
3 .1 The European Council 
requests the Community Institutions 
by the utilization of the new financial 
instrument and the European Invest-
ment Bank to make available for a 
period of 5 years loans of up to 
1,000 million EUA per year to these 
countries on special conditions. 
3.2 The European Council 
requests the Commission to submit 
a proposal to provide interest rate 
subsidies of 3 per cent for these 
loans, with the following elements: 
The total cost of this measure, 
divided into annual tranches of 200 
million EUA each over a period of 5 
years shall not exceed 1,000 
million EUA. 
3.3 Any less prosperous member 
country which subsequently effect-
ively and fully participates in the 
mechanisms would have the right of 
access to this facility within the 
financial limits mentioned above. 
Member States not participating 
effectively and fully in the mechan-
isms will not contribute to the 
financing of the scheme. 
3.4 The funds thus provided are 
to be concentrated on the financing 
of selected infrastructure projects 
and programmes, with the under-
standing that any direct or indirect 
distortion of the competitive 
position of specific industries within 
member States will have to be 
avoided. 
3.5 The European Council 
requests the Council (Economics 
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and Finance Ministers) to take a 
decision on the above-mentioned 
proposals in time so that the 
relevant measures can become 
effective on April 1, 1979 at the 
latest. There should be a review at 
the end of the initial phase of the 
EMS. 
4 The European Council requests 
the Commission to study the 
relationship between greater conver-
gence in economic performance of 
the member States and the utilization 
of Community instruments, in par-
ticular the funds which aim at 
reducing structural imbalances. The 
results of these studies will be 
discussed at the next European 
Council. 
Notes 
The Resolution of the European 
Council of December 5, 1978 pub-
lished in this White Paper is an 
agreement between Heads of State 
and Government of the member 
States of the Community. The first 
part of the Resolution (A) deals 
with the monetary system proper. 
The second part (B) is about 
measures designed to strengthen the 
economies of the less prosperous 
member States of the European 
Monetary System. The following 
reference are to the paragraphs of 
these two sections. 
A2.1 The statement that the 
value and composition of the ECU 
will be identical with the value of the 
EUA at the outset of the system 
means that sterling will be included 
with other Community currencies in 
theECU. 
A3.1-A3.6 The UK is not 
participating in the exchange rate 
mechanism. Subject to the follow-
ing, these paragraphs will not there-
fore apply to sterling. 
3.1 contains a provision which 
would permit the UK to participate 
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at a later date if it wished. 3.2 pro-
vides for reciprocal consultation 
3.1 contains a provision which 
would permit the UK to participate 
at a later date if it wished. 3.2 pro-
vides for reciprocal consultation 
about important decisions concern-
ing exchange rate policy between 
countries inside and outside the 
exchange rate mechanism. At the 
end of 3.6 there is provision for a 
review of certain aspects of the 
exchange rate mechanism which 
would be a matter for the appro-
priate Community bodies, including 
the Council of Finance Ministers. 
The UK would therefore participate 
in that review. 
A3.8 contains in its final sentence 
a provision which enables the UK to 
choose whether or not to deposit 20 
per cent of gold and dollar reserves 
with the European Monetary Co-
operation Fund against issue to us 
of a corresponding value of ECU's. 
A6. l refers to the Council 
Regulations which, with appropriate 
explanatory notes, are now before 
Parliament. Approval of these 
Regulations at the Community level 
is a matter for the Council of 
Finance Ministers. The European 
Council Resolution requests the 
Finance Council to consider these 
Regulations on December 18, 1978. 
B3.1 and 3.2 describe a scheme 
of loans at subsidised interest rates 
which, within specific limits, would 
be made available to less prosperous 
member States of the Community 
participating fully in the EMS 
exchange rate mechanism. The 
loans would be those made by the 
European Investment Bank or as 
part of the so-called Ortoli facility. 
This facility will consist of loans 
raised in the market by the Com-
munity itself, but managed as 
regards appraisal of projects, 
administration, etc. by the European 
Investment Bank. The total of loans 
made available at subsidized rates 
would be up to 1,000 million EVA 
(about £670 million) a year for each 
of 5 years, with an interest rate 
subsidy of 3 per cent. The interest 
rate subsidy would however be 
limited to a maximum of 200 million 
EVA (about £135 million) a year for 
5 years. These loans would be con-
centrated on infrastructure projects 
and programmes and should not 
involve any distortion, direct or 
indirect, of the competitive position 
of specific industries. 
B3.3 provides that a less pros-
perous member country which joins 
the exchange rate mechanism later 
can then have access to these sub-
sidised loans. It also provides that a 
state not participating in the 
exchange rate mechanism will not 
contribute to the financing of the 
scheme. In the case of the UK the 
effect would be that it would neither 
qualify for loans with an interest 
subsidy, nor contribute towards 
interest subsidies for others, so long 
as it was not participating in the 
exchange rate mechanism. O 
1 In the French language version this will appear as 'Ecu' in 
the singular and 'Ecus' in the plural. 
1 In the French text 'doivent'. 
In the German text 'soil'. 
Quotation of the month 
'The pro-European strategy does not guarantee success, though it may be said 
that the anti-European position does not guarantee failure.' 
New Statesman, December 1, 1978. 
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The month 
in Europe 
NZ butter 
Under Community rules, the UK 
can import 120,000 tonnes of New 
Zealand butter in 1979. If this is 
more than a quarter of total UK 
direct consumption, the surplus is 
supposed to be sold for processing 
by the food industry. However, as 
the Commission has just pointed 
out in answer to a European Parlia-
mentary Question, this might simply 
raise difficulties for Community 
butter at present sold to the food 
industry, so the extra New Zealand 
butter continues to be sold through 
normal channels in the shops. 
The Community's Council of 
Ministers has also agreed to reduce 
the levy on 17,000 tonnes of NZ 
butter and to pay the UK an addi-
tional 6p per lb subsidy on 51,000 
tonnes of Community butter. 
£215mforUK 
The European investment Bank 
has just signed with the National 
Water Council a framework agree-
ment to give favourable consideration 
to loans up to £210m, while at the 
same time granting a loan to £5m to 
the Grampian Regional Council. 
UK's EEC exports up 
Britain's exports to the rest of the 
Community rose by 5 Yi per cent in 
the three months ending October 
1978, as compared with a 3 per cent 
increase in her imports from the rest 
of the Nine. 
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Jenkins in US 
Commission President Roy Jenkins 
visited the US from December 1-17. 
In Washington he saw President 
Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance, and other members of the 
Administration and the Congress. 
Ecosoc in Glasgow 
On November 21-23, a 25-man 
delegation from the Economic and 
Social Committee visited Glasgow, 
in particular to look at shipping and 
ship-building problems. 
Flowers to Holland 
The UK has developed an export 
trade in bulbs and flowers from 
small beginnings in the 1970s to 
£4.25m in the first nine months of 
1978, according to Dr Keith Dexter, 
Director-General of the Agricultural 
Advisory and Development Service. 
One half of the bulbs and almost 
two-thirds of the flowers are exported 
to ... the Netherlands. 
NZ investment 
Capital flows from the European 
Community to New Zealand have 
grown rapidly in recent years, accord-
ing to the December 1978 issue of 
New Zealand Quarterly, from the 
NZ High Commission in London. 
Direct investment rose from $19.3m 
in 1967-8 to $105.lm in 1976-7; 
and total flows, public and private, 
over the ten-year period totalled 
$1,788.3m. 
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Europe and 
its money 
Roy Jenkins on EMS 
1979 will be the 10th anniversary 
of the decision taken by the Heads 
of State and Government of the 
Community to work towards an 
economic and monetary union. The 
progress which has been made since 
then has been disappointing, but the 
objective remains intact. We are 
now making our second major 
effort to move towards it through 
the establishment of a zone of 
monetary stability in Europe to be 
achieved through the creation of a 
European Monetary System. If we 
succeed we shall give our Com-
munity the most creative impulse 
since the first achievements after the 
signature of the Treaty of Rome; if 
we fail we shall risk not just a 
minor setback but the frustration of 
one of our fundamental purposes 
with all the political and economic 
consequences. 
Florence 
Just over a year ago I tried to set 
out in a speech at Florence the 
reasons for re-examining the case 
for economic and monetary union. I 
drew attention to the need for a 
more efficient and rationalized 
development of industry and com-
merce in Europe. I spoke of the so 
far unexercised ability of the Euro-
peans to create a currency of their 
own, based on a spread of wealth 
and power comparable with those of 
10 
the United States: in doing so I said 
that although I thought floating 
exchange rates were here to stay, 
they should be between continents 
rather than between the countries of 
Western Europe, all of which are 
intermingled in a thickly populated 
half continent, and nine of which 
are united in a common market and 
pledged to political and economic 
integration. I said that control of a 
single European currency by a single 
European monetary authority could 
achieve a measure of anti-infla-
tionary discipline beyond the reach 
of most individual member States. 
I argued that policies which would 
favour stability and expansion, 
strengthen the demand on a broad 
geographical basis, and avoid ex-
change rate crises, would give a 
much needed new impulse on an 
historic scale to the European 
economy with the effect of reducing 
unemployment and creating new 
wealth throughout the system. I 
referred to the need for redistri-
bution and transfer of resources 
within the system so that public 
finance could be channelled to 
poorer areas and the imbalances 
which continue to disfigure Com-
munity Europe could be counter-
acted. I called for decentralization 
in some fields to balance the centrali-
zation which would be necessary in 
a limited number of others. Finally I 
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spoke of economic and monetary 
union as a means towards political 
integration and the ultimate 
European union to which the 
member States of the Community 
are committed. 
Since then things have moved 
further and faster than I - or I 
think anyone else - thought pos-
sible. Perhaps I should single out 
two main reasons for this change of 
climate. The first is that people 
became better aware that the dif-
ferential movement of European 
currencies against each other was 
making nonsense of the notion of a 
common market, and still more that 
of a Community, and indeed affect-
ing the ability of national govern-
ments to run their own economies 
alone or with other members of the 
Community. Those countries in sur-
plus, most strongly export oriented, 
found that decline in demand from 
countries in deficit held back their 
ability to stimulate their economies; 
while those in deficit were frustrated 
in their efforts to achieve higher 
growth by a succession of exchange 
rate crises. Hence in part the relatively 
poor productivity of Europe, and 
relatively poor rate of growth and 
the relatively high rate of unemploy-
ment, all of which stood in marked 
contrast with what had been achieved 
in Europe in earlier decades of 
relative monetary stability. The 
United States and Japan, subject to 
inter-continental but not to internal 
monetary upheavals, performed 
better. 
Dollar weakness 
The second major factor was the 
continuing weakness of the US 
dollar and the increasing precarious-
ness of the international monetary 
system of which the dollar remains 
in practice, although not in theory 
(as under the Bretton Woods 
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arrangement), the essential pivot. 
To keep some sort of system going 
and discharge their responsibilities 
in the common interest, the Euro-
peans took in more dollars than they 
could conceivably want or need. 
This in turn had drastic effects on 
the ability of European govern-
ments to control their own money 
supply. In circumstances in which 
the world system was manifestly 
failing the Europeans not unnatur-
ally felt that they should try to 
achieve some stability among them-
selves both for its own sake and in 
order to make a contribution to a 
new and better balanced inter-
national system in the future. 
Essentials 
The essentials of the scheme on 
which all agreed to work can be 
stated as the creation of an ECU (or 
European Currency Unit) at the 
centre of the system and as a means 
of settlement between Community 
monetary authorities; the depositing 
of reserves for use among Com-
munity central banks; the co-
ordination of exchange rate policies 
with regard to third countries; and 
the eventual creation of a European 
Monetary Fund. 
Some of the arguments which 
have taken place in and out of the 
Community institutions and between 
governments necessarily have a 
highly technical character. At the 
same time most cover points of 
underlying importance. First there 
has been the discussion about the 
choice of a numeraire for the new 
system. Second there has been 
discussion about the width of 
margins to each side of the 
numeraire, and the possibility of 
adjustment. The question of adjust-
ment is more important. Any par-
ticipant in the system must be able 
to change its central rate if its costs 
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and prices move out of line with 
those of its competitors or if it has 
undergone a structural change in its 
balance of payments. It would 
obviously be contrary to the spirit of 
the whole enterprise if certain 
countries, in particular those with 
relatively high rates of inflation, 
availed themselves too often and too 
easily of the possibility of change 
and made no sustained effort to 
bring their inflation rates down to 
the level of their partners. Neverthe-
less some flexibility must be built 
into the system, and some of the 
fears which have been expressed 
about its absence seem to me ill-
founded. 
Reserves 
Next there has been substantial 
discussion about the extent of the 
reserves on which members of the 
system can draw, and the conditions 
on which they could do so. 
Obviously the larger the credit 
facilities, the less they are likely to 
be called upon. The more you have 
the less you need. There is no 
economy more self-defeating and 
short sighted than to fail to provide 
adequate reserves. 
The issues underlying the so-
called technical points are obviously 
of great importance. But they must 
be seen in the wider context of our 
continuing and now more 
determined and successful efforts to 
bring about greater convergence in 
the economic policies of the member 
States of the Community. Any 
arrangement for the future which 
was exclusively monetary would be 
bound to fail. The economies of the 
Community are now moving along 
more parallel paths than was the 
case a few years ago. Their trade 
with each other is immense. But the 
differences between them are still 
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substantial. Inflation rates vary con-
siderably. Resources are not evenly 
distributed. Growth rates are 
different. Budgetary and fiscal 
policies are different as well, with 
each government naturally doing 
what it finds best for its country's 
particular circumstances and with 
only some regard for the interests of 
the Community as a whole. Clearly 
if the new European Monetary 
System is to be, in the words of 
Bremen, durable and effective, it 
must take account of the economic 
as well as monetary circumstances 
of each member State, and be 
matched by a still greater effort for 
coordination on the part of member 
governments than any have been 
willing to attempt in the past. The 
Commission has made a series of 
proposals for such coordination, 
and has emphasised - as I do again 
today the need for such 
coordination to be seen in the frame-
work of an eventual economic and 
monetary union. 
Strengthening 
The specific argument which has 
since arisen is over the phrase then 
accepted which said that there 
would be 'concurrent studies of the 
action needed to strengthen the 
economies of the less prosperous 
member countries', all put clearly in 
the context of the European 
Monetary System. This is obviously 
of crucial importance to those 
countries which are less prosperous, 
and I betray no secret if I place in 
this category Ireland, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. What action 
should be taken to strengthen the 
economies of these countries is still 
under lively discussion. Some have 
talked of the need to produce a 
more rational transfer of resources 
inside the Community than arises 
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out of such existing Community 
mechanisms as the Community 
budget and the Common Agricul-
tural Policy. Others have spoken of 
the need for extension and reinforce-
ment of such Community instru-
ments as the Regional Fund and the 
Social Fund. Yet others have spoken 
of special loans at favourable rates 
of interest arranged through the 
European Investment Bank or other 
mechanisms. None of these questions 
is settled. The debate about them 
has opened up some pretty funda-
mental questions about the function-
ing of the Community and the 
equity of its present mechanisms. 
This is all to the good. But I think 
we all recognise that the problems of 
this magnitude cannot be fully 
settled very quickly with a speed 
sufficient to meet the stringest time-
table - desirably stringent - for 
the setting up of a European 
Monetary System. But settled they 
must be if we are to have a Com-
munity which genuinely represents 
the common interests of member 
States. 
The interests of our member States 
are not in all cases the same. There 
is, for example, an obvious tempta-
tion for the existing members of the 
snake to conceive of a European 
Monetary System which would in 
many of its essentials be no more 
than the old snake writ large. There 
is another temptation to which my 
own country of Britain is subject: to 
see the system as yet another 
continental entanglement conceived 
in the interests of countries whose 
economic performance and prob-
lems are different from their own. 
My answer to those who would like 
the system simply to be a super 
snake is that it would simply be un-
workable if it included, as it should, 
all or nearly all members of the 
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Community. My answer to those 
who see it as a new entanglement in 
the interest of others is that first 
they should be less defensively 
suspicious (such suspicion has not 
served them well in the past); and 
second that if it should prove an 
entanglement it would mean that the 
system did not properly reflect the 
common interest and was for what-
ever reason badly designed. 
International 
The European Monetary System 
is in no way directed against the 
international system nor against 
the US dollar. The health of the 
dollar is essential to the health of the 
international system, and we greatly 
welcome the measures recently 
taken by President Carter to 
strengthen the dollar. At the same 
time we must face the fact that the 
Bretton Woods system as we knew it 
after the war has broken down, and 
that we must gradually seek some 
new arrangements to take its place. 
No-one has suggested that the Euro-
pean Currency Unit should take the 
place of the dollar for which a 
leading role in the international 
monetary system remains necessary 
and unquestioned. But it is possible 
to envisage a system in which 
responsibility is more widely shared 
and in which both the European 
Currency Unit and of course the 
Japanese yen would play a more 
important part. This is to look 
further ahead than is perhaps now 
easy to do. Today I want simply to 
emphasise that we live in one inter-
dependent world and that what we 
plan for Europe must from the 
beginning be seen as something 
which does not conflict with but 
assists the interests of the world as a 
whole.* D 
• A shortened version of an address co the Basie Society of 
Statistics and Political Economy. 
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The Community 
budget 
Does Britain pay too much? 
There have been various estimates 
of the scale of the United Kingdom's 
contributions to the EEC budget 
and the way in which the budget is 
spent. In fact: 
D the total Community budget is 
less than 3 per cent of combined 
national budgets of the Nine; 
D Britain's gross share of the 
budget broadly reflects the UK's 
share of Community GDP and 
amounts to about 2.6 per cent of 
UK governments expenditure; 
D the subsidies on UK food imports 
(meas) cost about £500m in 1977. If 
they were included on the UK 
account, Britain would be in credit 
for 1977; 
D agricultural support would have 
to be financed in the UK if it were 
not funded by the Community 
budget. It could cost £1,000m 
annually; 
D the latest calculations are based 
only on the 1977 budget and are 
therefore theoretical extrapolations; 
D the European Commission is 
pressing for the budget to be better 
balanced to give more help to the 
less prosperous industrial regions of 
the Community; 
D the cost per person in Britain for 
the gross contribution is about £12 a 
year. The cost of central govern-
ment expenditure is about £800 per 
person. 
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UK contribution 
Britain's gross contribution to the 
budget in 1978 is reckoned to be 
about £1, 120m out of a total budget 
of £8,000m - a proportion of 
about 14 per cent. This roughly 
reflects the UK share of Community 
GNP. After taking into account 
receipts from Community funds, 
HM Treasury estimates that the net 
contribution will be about £660m. 
This amounts to less than one per 
cent of Britain's GDP and to about 
2.6 per cent of central government 
expenditure. 
It is not surprising that Britain's 
share of the budget is rising. It was 
agreed in the Treaty of Accession 
that the UK would gradually move 
to a full share by 1980. 
The introduction of the basket 
European unit of account (EUA) 
instead of the gold-linked unit of 
account (ua) has also led to some 
increase, because it applies up-to-
date exchange rates rather than a 
1968 rate to budget contributions. 
Balance 
The Community's budget must be 
seen in the context of Community 
policies as a whole. It provides 
funds only for sectors where the 
Community has agreed to the 
principle of some central financing: 
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agriculture, regional development, 
training, aid to developing countries 
and research, for instance. 
About 70 per cent of the 1978 
budget was spent on agriculture. 
In this sector, virtually all national 
expenditure on farm support has 
been taken over by the Community 
budget, including the expenditure 
which would otherwise have been 
incurred in the United Kingdom for 
agricultural support. 
Measures are now in train to 
reduce the cost of some aspects of 
the common agricultural policy. 
Estimates 
Some recently quoted figures for 
the UK's net contributions are 
hypothetical calculations taking the 
pattern of the 1977 budget with the 
allocation of funds in that year and 
projecting the figures forward to 
1980, when the system of own 
resources will be operating in full. 
The calculations do not take 
account of certain factors which will 
affect the actual out-turn of the 
budget in 1980. 
DPolicy development 
The Commission is pressing for 
changes in the balance of Com-
munity expenditure which will cut 
certain elements of the agricultural 
budget and increase spending in 
other sectors such as the regional 
and social funds. 
DMCAs 
Monetary compensatory amounts 
(MCAs) are paid to exporters in 
other Community countries selling 
foodstuffs on the British market. 
They are a benefit to British con-
sumers and to the British balance of 
payments, since they make food 
available at lower prices than apply 
elsewhere in the Community. 
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Because they are now paid to the 
exporter, they are channelled 
through the budgets of the exporting 
country and do not therefore reduce 
Britain's budget contribution. 
For the purposes of the financial 
regulation (see below) these MCAs 
are to be taken into account in 
calculating the net contribution of 
member States. This was the 
principle accepted by all nine 
member governments for the purpose 
of calculations under the financial 
mechanism. If the MCAs payable in 
1977 are set against Britain's budget 
contribution, that year's £416m net 
payment by the UK becomes an £84m 
net benefit. If the same figures are 
projected through to 1980, the net 
contribution of the UK would be 
less than half Germany's net contri-
bution; with the UK at £306m and 
Germany at £686m. 
D Financial mechanism 
The 'financial mechanism' was 
published in the EEC Official 
Journal in May 1976 and is designed 
to protect member States whose 
gross contributions, according to 
various criteria, are becoming 
excessive. If Britain's contribution 
to the budget in 1980 triggered this 
mechanism, it could significantly 
reduce such deficit as might exist. 
D Resources after 1982 
The present sources of finance for 
Community policies will probably 
no longer be adequate after 1982 as 
expenditure rises and the real value 
of customs duties declines. The 
Commission has therefore sent a 
green paper to the Council of 
Ministers suggesting that a pro-
gressive system of budget financing 
should be studied, which would 
avoid aggravating existing economic 
disparities. D 
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EMS and 
the dollar 
Christopher Tugendhat describes the 
background 
One of the main reasons why the 
member States wish to stabilize the 
relationship between their cur-
rencies is that their nine national 
economies are now very closely 
linked to each other by ties of 
investment and trade. The USA 
provides the member States with 
their largest non-Community export 
market. But the Community itself is 
now a full Customs Union and for 
each of the member States much the 
most important export market of all 
is that provided by its partners. The 
United Kingdom now sends 36 per 
cent of her total exports to the rest 
of the Community, Germany 46 per 
cent, and France 51 per cent. For 
the smaller member States the 
figures are even higher. 
In these circumstances of very 
high mutual dependence, the severe 
fluctuations of recent years in the 
relative value of the member States' 
currencies have combined with 
external pressures to cause major 
strains in their national economies, 
distorting monetary and fiscal 
policy and inhibiting investment. 
EMS could, I believe, provide the 
Community's internal trade with 
similar, though obviously less com-
plete, protection from the con-
sequences of monetary turbulence; 
and in so doing would greatly assist 
the Community countries in their 
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efforts to achieve sustained and 
inflation free growth. 
It is of course very much in the 
United States' interest that we 
succeed in reviving growth in the 
Community because it will help the 
US to overcome her own balance of 
payments problems. 
The EMS should also help to 
restore stability at global level, to 
the obvious advantage of all the 
world's trading nations. At the 
moment one of the main causes of 
instability in the world's currency 
markets is that speculators wishing 
to move out of dollars know that 
they can swiftly push up the value of 
the stronger European currencies, 
particularly the Deutschmark. 
However, speculators are less likely 
to be able to push up all the parities 
of an EMS together, and the 
incentive to sell dollars for quick 
profit would therefore be corres-
pondingly diminished. 
Recognising that an effective and 
sensible EMS is not only in the 
European but also the general 
interest, the American Government 
has publicly voiced its strong support 
for the Community's efforts to 
solve the technical and political 
problems that must be overcome. I 
would like, as a member of the 
European Commission, to express 
our appreciation of the Admini-
stration's constructive response. D 
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